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The translation and sedimentation of accounting reforms. 
A comparison of the UK, Austrian and Italian experiences
Abstract
Since the late 1980s, there has been a significant and progressive movement away from the 
traditional Public Administration (PA) systems, in favour of NPM-type accounting tools and 
ideas inspired by the private sector. More recently, a new focus on governance systems, 
under the banner Public Governance (PG), has emerged. In this paper it is argued that 
reforms are not isolated events, but are embedded in more global discourses of modernisation 
and influenced by the institutional pressures present in a certain field at certain points in time. 
Using extensive document analysis in three countries with different administrative regimes 
(the UK, Italy and Austria), we examine public sector accounting and budgeting reforms and 
the underlying discourses put forward in order to support the change. We investigate the 
extent to which the actual content of the reforms and the discourses they are embedded within 
are connected over time; that is, whether, and to what degree, the reform “talk” matches the 
“decisions”. The research shows that in both the UK and in Italy there is consistency between 
the debates and the decided changes, although the dominant discourse in each country differs, 
while in Austria changes are decided gradually, and only after they have been announced 
well in advance in the political debate. We find that in all three countries the new ideas and 
concepts layer and sediment above the existing ones, rather than replace them. Although all 
three countries underwent similar accounting and budgeting reforms and relied on similar 
institutional discourses, each made its own specific translation of the ideas and concepts and 
is characterized by a specific formation of sedimentations. In addition, the findings suggest 
that, at present in the three countries, the PG discourse is used to supplement, rather than 
supplant, other prevailing discourses.
Keywords: budgeting reforms, reform discourses, central government, sedimentation, 
translation. 
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The translation and sedimentation of accounting reforms. A comparison of the UK, 
Austrian and Italian experiences 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, many Western central governments have engaged in reform processes 
aimed at improving public sector practices, often embracing the so-called New Public 
Management (NPM – see, for instance, Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), with a 
main area of change involving radical adjustments in accounting and budgeting systems. 
Governments claimed that better accounting, budgeting and measurement practices would 
provide more appropriate information for decision makers; better information would lead to 
superior decisions; and better decisions would lead to a more efficient and more effective 
public sector (Chan, 2003; Likierman, 2003). Since the late 1980s, there has been a 
significant and progressive movement away from the traditional Public Administration (PA) 
systems, in favour of NPM-type accounting tools and ideas inspired by the private sector. 
More recently, under the banner Public Governance (PG), a new focus on governance 
systems to steer public services and actors has emerged (Mayntz, 2009; Osborne, 2010; 
Rhodes, 1997). However, despite the tendency for homogenization and convergence of 
public-sector reforms across countries, changes are often argued, interpreted and carried out 
differently depending on the jurisdiction (Knill, 2001; Pollitt, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011).
A number of studies have investigated the implementation of public policies in 
general (Bardach, 1977; Barzelay and Jacobson, 2009; Dunleavy, 1991; Hill and Hupe, 2002; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Ongaro and Valotti, 2008; Parrado, 2008), and accounting 
reforms in particular (Christiaens, 1999; Christiaens and Peteghem, 2007; Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2006a; Pettersen, 2001). While this stream of research is particularly important, 
we focus here on an area which has been less investigated in accounting: the way different 
systems and actors differently translate accounting reforms at the national level 
(Czarniawska, 2011; Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). By translation we mean the 
transportation of meanings across cultural contexts combined with transformation, i.e., the 
translation often results in a change in that which is translated (Campbell, 2004; 
Czarniawska, 2011; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Drori et al., forthc.; Meyer and Höllerer, 
2010; Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Strang and Soule, 1998). With 
respect to accounting translations, not only is it important to understand the technicalities of 
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what is being translated and the way it is being interpreted, but also it is also important to 
appreciate the way in which accounting practices are mobilised, the aspirations and ambitions 
attached to them and the roles that they play (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991; Kurunmäki et 
al., 2010). Accounting can therefore be seen as possessing both discursive and instrumental 
elements. As accounting instruments and related ideas travel, they come into contact with 
local ideas which define different and variable relationships across space, actors and 
aspirations. In this paper we argue that accounting reforms are not isolated events, but are 
embedded in more global discourses of modernisation and influenced by the institutional 
pressures present in a certain field at certain points in time. Local translations may change the 
object of translation almost beyond recognition, and the institutional features or particular 
contexts may be much more resistant to change than agents of change often wish 
(Czarniawska, 2011).
Using a comparative approach, we analyse public sector accounting and budgeting 
reforms and focus particularly on the arguments and underlying discourses put forward in 
order to support and decide upon these changes. Rather than investigate an implementation 
gap (which many papers do), we consider the extent to which the discourse relating to the 
reforms and the actual content of the reform decisions are connected over time; that is, 
whether, and to what degree, the reform debate matches the reform “decision” (for the 
distinction between the levels of talk, decision, and action see especially Brunsson, 1989; 
Pollitt 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). To explore these questions, we chose three 
countries with different administrative traditions, namely the United Kingdom (UK), Italy 
and Austria, carried out an analysis of their official debates, which took place over the past 30 
years, and reconstructed the respective accounting and budgeting reform decisions on the 
national level. Our study provides an updated view of the position of countries from different 
European administrative traditions and their NPM-reform agendas. The paper also 
contributes to the current debate on the emergence of PG ideas as a self-standing, 
autonomous paradigm (Osborne, 2010). Moreover, the study also seeks to understand better 
the process through which the various reform discourses develop and are shaped in different 
contexts. Indeed, it has been suggested that new ideas and systems often layer and sediment 
above the existing ones, rather than replace them (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Liguori, 
2012; Malhotra and Hinings, 2005; Olsen, 2009) and this interaction can generate further 
differences in the development and interpretation of discourses in different countries. Our 
study sheds more light on these sedimentation mechanisms. 
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The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on reform 
discourses and public-sector accounting; section 3 gives a brief overview of the methods; and 
section 4 describes the debates and the reform decisions in the three analysed countries. 
Finally, section 5 compares the overall results, while section 6 draws the main conclusions 
and suggests possible further research avenues.
2. Reform discourses and public-sector financial management 
An increasing body of research has focused on the phenomenon of homogeneity and 
convergence of reforms (Bouckaert, 2007; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Gualmini, 2008; 
Kickert, 2008; Olsen, 2006; Pollitt, 2001; Schnapp, 2004). Such studies draw attention to a 
variety of contextual factors that structure the way in which countries organize their 
administrations and point out that very often reform initiatives have been seen as local 
variations of more global discourses of modernisation. In the public sector, similar reforms 
have taken place in many countries, but with visible local variations, making comparative 
case studies particularly needed (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, 2011; Ferlie et al., 1996; 
Hammerschmid and Meyer, 2005). Public sector management, in particular, has tended to 
move from a traditional PA model, to models embracing NPM and PG ideas. For analytical 
purposes, these may be viewed as separate discourses. However, some common ideas and 
concepts (for example, the concern in relation to various types of accountability practices), 
while being afforded greater prominence in one model rather than another, overlap (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011). 
NPM ideas have shaped public sector reforms in a range of countries (including the 
UK, Italy and Austria) over the last decades and have emphasised, in particular, the adoption 
of private-sector practices and behaviours. These adjustments have been viewed as ways of 
improving planning, controlling and efficiency, and have drawn heavily on new accounting, 
budgeting and performance measurement systems (Lapsley, 2008; Steccolini, 2004). The 
array of new managerial tools ranges from medium-term planning, performance budgeting 
and performance management (to focus on outputs rather than merely inputs), accrual and 
cost accounting (as means to steer resources and outputs), to consolidated accounting 
statements and sustainability reports (to increase transparency), with countries introducing 
such changes with different intensities and at varying paces (Hood, 1995; Lüder and Jones, 
2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Wanna et al., 2010). Studies have often interpreted these 
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reforms as being exogenously driven and influenced by new regulations, with a final 
convergence towards a common isomorphic equilibrium (Collier, 2001; Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007). However, reforms 
linked to similar discourses (such as NPM) have been shown to foster different results 
(Etherington and Richardson, 1994; Liguori and Steccolini, 2012; Lounsbury, 2001; Ribeiro 
and Scapens, 2006), and similar results of change can sometimes be achieved through 
different kinds of processes (Liguori, 2012; Malhotra and Hinings, 2005). 
Extant theory discusses how change processes can be placed along a continuum that 
goes from a disruptive vision to a sedimented and layered one. For example, change can 
follow a more or less linear trajectory, where existing practices are replaced by new ideas and 
structures in response to contextual circumstances and competing institutional prescriptions 
(Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Romanelli and Tushman, 
1994), or, alternatively, it can take place through sedimentation, reflecting a pattern of new 
emerging structures and ideas super-imposed (or layered) on pre-existing ones. For example, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, p. 8) point out that “the detail of public sector reform often turns 
out to be more like geological sedimentation, where new layers overlie but do not replace or 
completely wash away the previous layer”. Christensen and Lægreid (2011) show that the 
transition between NPM and post-NPM ideas reflects a sedimentation process, where 
frequently even old PA models are brought back to life by reform translations and every-day 
activities. Different translation and sedimentation processes, they argue, are in part related to 
different administrative systems, path dependencies and contextual forces. This is consistent 
with Schneiberg’s findings, according to which even the most settled systems and structures 
are littered with “flotsam and jetsam” (2007, p. 47), i.e. with elements of earlier alternative 
orders often coexisting within apparently changed systems. Established institutional paths, 
indeed, may already contain in themselves structural possibilities and resources for 
transformation. Social, culture and organizational fragments of projects and institutional 
paths previously not taken or abandoned are vehicles for experimentation, revival, 
recombination and, ultimately, transformation by organizational actors. The continued 
presence of these latent ideas holds options for new discourse coalitions (Meyer and Höllerer, 
2010) that can challenge existing dominant arrangements, with the prevailing systems and 
structures being historically contingent and affected by political processes.
Echoing Schneiberg (2007), and with reference to accounting, it can also be claimed 
that instruments such as accrual accounting, cost accounting, budgeting and performance 
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measurement were all on the public sector reform agenda before the emergence of NPM 
(although not with the same force) and, equally, it is likely they will continue to be relevant 
in a post-NPM era. When accounting and budgeting reforms are decided, indeed, the way in 
which they are discussed, the pros and cons and the rhetoric and accounts used to promote or 
oppose them, are linked to the reform discourses that are historically available to the actors 
involved (Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 2003; Skelcher et al., 2005).
The NPM discourse has been recognised as dominating from the late 1980s to the 
beginning of the 2000s (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). NPM is a convenient, though a rather 
loose, term that is shorthand for a set of broadly similar administrative doctrines that has 
shaped the reform agenda in the public sector in many OECD countries. NPM claims to make 
government more efficient and “consumer responsive” by injecting businesslike methods, 
and identifies a set of specific concepts and practices to facilitate this, such as: market-type 
mechanisms (including quasi-markets) and controls; competitive contracts; and performance 
indicators and targets (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). This can be evidenced by, among other 
things, the increasing adoption of private sector managerial and accounting techniques 
(output-based budgeting, accruals and resource accounting, annual reports, extended 
performance measurement and reporting, managerial control systems, balanced scorecards, 
etc.), the contracting-out of public services and the break-up of large units of government into 
smaller quasi-autonomous units. Better management is claimed to result because of rational 
economic decision making. As a consequence, NPM advocates strive to transform the old 
bureaucrats into managers, seen as central actors in the process of change, and convert them 
into individuals who focus on economic rationality and efficiency, effectiveness and results 
(Liguori et al., 2012). Moreover, it underlines the importance to “let managers manage”, by 
allowing them greater autonomy from the political bodies (Kettl, 1997, p. 447). NPM has 
been presented as “the rise of a global social movement with considerable force” (Meyer, 
1998, p. 7) and a quasi-global paradigm superseding the traditional ‘old’ PA logic (Dunleavy 
and Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991; Hughes, 1994). Accrual accounting, in particular, is claimed to 
support better-informed decisions (when compared with the traditional cash-based system) on 
the balance between current and capital expenditure, taking into account the opportunity cost 
of capital and its consumption over time (Anessi-Pessina and Steccolini, 2007; Bergmann, 
2009; Chan, 2003; Likierman, 2003; Lüder and Jones, 2003). Consistently, the focus of 
accounting tools is expected to shift gradually from spending and incremental budgets to 
costs and revenues, assets and liabilities, definition of goals in terms of outputs, and 
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efficiency and effectiveness. However, despite the articulated benefits of these changes, an 
increasing body of literature has criticised their adoption by public organizations on both 
theoretical and practical grounds (Guthrie, 1998; Wanna et al., 2010).
Existing international comparisons of public-sector reforms indicate that there is 
considerable variability in the way NPM reforms have been translated and embedded in 
specific national settings (Hood, 1995; Kurunmäki et al., 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), 
with changes being introduced at a quicker pace and more enthusiastically in some countries 
compared to others (Flynn and Strehl, 1996; Kickert, 2011; Ongaro, 2011 – for accounting 
reforms see, for example, Lüder, 1992). Hood (1995) distinguished between high, medium 
and low adopters of NPM-ideas, where the UK (as well as countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada) was viewed as a high-intensity adopter, with Italy and Austria (and 
countries such as the Republic of Ireland and France) viewed as medium-intensity adopters. 
He tentatively suggested an explanation for this related to the initial endowment, where the 
motive arising from the savings potentially occurring and the opportunity left by limited 
constitutional checks on central governments would represent the main determinants. 
Alternatively, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) more recently contend that reforms are easier to 
push through in centralised states, which operate a majoritarian or single party approach to 
government, rather than a consensual approach. Moreover, it is argued that public interest 
systems, where the state has a less dominant role within society and where there may be 
variety of sources of political advice available, will be quicker and more effective in 
reforming than Rechtsstaat models (Ongaro, 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), where the 
roles of rule and formality prevail. These effects will be mitigated by the cultural 
characteristics of the country, where a greater power distance and uncertainty avoidance, 
together with a shorter-term orientation, will tend to slow down changes.  
PA systems, the ideas of which have dominated public service delivery regimes since 
the late Nineteenth century to the early 1980s, have at their heart the rule of law, where 
politics and administration are clearly separated and the hegemony of professionals is 
dominant with respect to public service delivery (Hood, 1991). In such schemes, politicians 
are responsible for defining general plans, whereas the administration (made up of 
professionals) has responsibility for executing them. Moreover, control is hierarchical and 
bureaucratic, exerted through rules, formal procedures and norms that legitimise and regulate 
administrative action. With respect to accounting, the budget plays a central role as a basis 
for the political negotiation and the (generally incremental) allocation of resources among 
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different political programmes and purposes, with the budget seen as a political act which 
translates political goals into appropriations of financial resources (Wildavsky, 1964). 
Attention is focused on the legitimacy of the budget process and, ex-post, on the comparison 
between actual and authorised expenditure (ter Bogt, 2003). In such a scheme, accounting is 
intended primarily to ensure compliance and curtail spending.  
Osborne (2010) argues that NPM, rather than being the final destination of a reform 
process, has “been a transitory state in the evolution” (p. 1) from a regime of traditional PA to 
PG. He contends that both the traditional PA and the NPM models are failures unable “to 
capture the complex reality of the design, delivery and management of public services in the 
twenty-first century” (p. 5) and calls for a more sophisticated understanding of public policy 
adoption, implementation and public service delivery. To this aim, PG ideas have been 
introduced, challenging NPM models with an increased focus on integration, networks and 
horizontal coordination. This has been accompanied, however, by a partial rediscovery of 
rule and legal principles (Hill and Hupe, 2007; Hupe et al., 2000; Osborne, 2010). The 
concept of governance, as part of the PG model, is not an alternative to government, but 
represents a wider and more inclusive system of ideas, based on partnerships among 
government, business and citizens’ associations. The emphasis is on networks, partnerships 
and negotiated voluntary cooperation, rather than competition or hierarchies. The PG model 
moves away from the traditional hierarchical forms of organizations and hinges on more 
devolved and participative (task-specific) controls (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011; Rhodes, 1997). It builds on ideas relating to more efficient and flexible 
service delivery procedures (concepts highlighted in the NPM model) to answer the needs of 
an increasingly diverse citizenry and acknowledges an increased complexity of public-sector 
accountability mechanisms as a response to increasing numbers of stakeholders and 
ambiguous objectives (Bovens, 2007; Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). PG particularly 
recognises both a plural state (where multiple interdependent actors contribute to the delivery 
of public services) and a pluralist state (where multiple processes inform policymaking) 
(Lynn et al., 2001; Osborne, 2010; Peters, 2008). It stresses the role of inter-actor 
relationships with an emphasis on trust control mechanisms, service processes and outcomes. 
Hence, the focus of accounting techniques moves more and more towards the reassurance of 
social efficacy and effectiveness (highlighting the ensuring of citizens’ satisfaction and 
attention to outcomes), as well as external accountability and transparency (European 
Commission, 2001; OECD, 1995; World Bank, 1994).
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PA, NPM and PG can therefore be identified as three different discourses (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011), with accrual accounting and budgeting, cost accounting, and performance 
measurement each being capable of being viewed through each of these separate lenses. 
While NPM stresses the introduction of accrual accounting as well as output and 
performance-oriented systems, PG puts greater emphasis on the need for external 
accountability and transparency. Of course, these categorizations serve here as heuristic and 
analytical tools, since they represent a simplification; in reality elements of each discourse 
can coexist with each other or overlap.  
3. Empirical design and methods 
This paper focuses on the changes in accounting and budgeting systems in the central 
governments of the UK, Italy and Austria over the last three decades. Besides the content of 
the decisions taken to change the systems, we are also interested in how the national 
translations of the broader reform discourses have impacted the way in which these reforms 
are debated. In particular, we investigate the extent to which official reform talk and reform 
decisions (Brunsson, 1989; Pollitt, 2001) are aligned and linked over time. 
In order to select the countries of study, we followed prior research (Kickert, 2008; 
Ongaro, 2009; Pierre, 1995) that emphasised how different historical and institutional 
backgrounds can affect the form and the content of administrative reforms and, as a 
consequence, lead to substantially different reform trajectories. Hence, three countries with 
different styles and traditions were selected: the UK, representing the Anglo-Saxon system; 
Austria, a Continental European (Hammerschmid and Meyer, 2005; Meyer and 
Hammerschmid, 2010) or Germanic (Painter and Peters, 2010) state, and Italy, a member of 
the French (Loughlin and Peters, 1997), Napoleonic (Painter and Peters, 2010) or Southern 
European (Demmke and Moilanen, 2010; Hajnal, 2003; Torres, 2004) system. As mentioned 
above, the UK has been historically categorised as an early and high-intensity adopter of 
NPM-related reforms (present already in the 1980s), while Italy and Austria followed around 
a decade later (Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). We will show that, despite quite 
different starting points, all three countries were driven by similar accounting reforms relying 
on similar institutional discourses (previously identified as PA, NPM and PG), albeit with 
distinct “translations”. In order to cover the relevant reform initiatives and debates in the 
three countries, we chose an observation period spanning three decades from 1980 to 2010. 
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The history of the changes decided in the accounting and budgeting systems in the 
three countries was reconstructed on the basis of the relevant official reform documents, 
archival materials (such as published articles), and interviews with central government 
managers. Following a textual analysis approach, we reconstructed the discursive dynamics 
on the basis of specific text genres that accompanied the legislative process in the three 
countries, i.e. laws, technical commentaries to the bills, and debates in parliamentary 
chambers and committees1. Austrian documents included (for a total of 28 documents and 
492 pages): (i) text of the law in the Federal Law Gazette; (ii) comments to the bills in which 
principles, background and reasoning for the amendments were outlined and each paragraph 
of the law that is to be changed was described and commented, and (iii) transcripts of the 
final discussion in both chambers of parliament (National Assembly and Federal Assembly) 
and all parliamentary committee reports discussing modifications to the draft laws. In Italy 
the data stemmed from the following documents (42 in total, 1,443 pages): (i) text of the law 
in the Official Gazette; (ii) guidelines (typically called “Circolari”) and decree laws issued by 
the government and concerning the directions for the enactment of the related law; (iii) 
transcripts of the first and the final discussion (which in Italy represented all the discussions 
taken) in both chambers of parliament (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) and all 
parliamentary committee reports discussing modifications to the draft laws. Finally, the UK 
documents comprised (a total of 47 documents, 2,455 pages): (i) text of the enacted law as in 
the parliament’s national archives; (ii) explanatory notes to the Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting (RAB) bill (the only bill issued over the analysed period), accounting for the 
background and rationale of the law and its amendments; (iii) administrative reports which 
explored areas with some significant focus on accounting and budgeting reform (such as the 
launch of the Financial Management Initiative, issues regarding the establishment of 
Executive Agencies and how accountability might be discharged, discussions on measuring 
and managing performance, Green and White papers, the Treasury Committee’s reports on 
“Resource Accounting and Budgeting in government”, etc.) issued by governmental and 
parliamentary committees2; and (iv) transcripts of the first and the final bill discussion in both 
chambers of parliament (House of Commons and House of Lords) and all parliamentary 

1 This does not deny the relevance of other communication arenas, such as the media (see Meyer and Höllerer, 
2010). However, as the area of financial and budgetary accounting reforms can be assumed to be “expert talk”, 
we expect these documents to be representative of the relevant arguments. 
2 In the UK (a common law country) most of the accounting and budgeting changes did not pass through law, 
but rather administrative acts.
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committee reports discussing modifications to the law or an existing administrative 
regulation.
Each of the three discourses provides characteristic standard narratives, vocabularies, 
ideas, concepts or instruments (Mills, 1940) that signify adherence to a particular discourse. 
For example, in a Continental European state, to stress that life-tenure for civil servants is a 
prerequisite for objectivity and political neutrality of the public sector can be regarded as a 
cue for the adherence to a PA discourse. To reconstruct the discourse(s) that the texts 
invoked, we developed a dictionary of such “signature elements”; a similar approach to that 
used in prior research on institutional logics and identities (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006; 
Rao et al., 2003; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) or frame 
analysis (Gamson, 1992; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Meyer and Höllerer, 2010; Vogel, 
2011). In particular, we developed a dictionary built on previous research from the three 
countries (Hammerschmid and Meyer, 2005; Lapsley, 1999, 2008; Liguori, 2010; Liguori 
and Steccolini, 2012; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006; Ongaro, 2011; Osborne, 2010) (see 
Appendix 1). For example: references to efficiency, contract, agencification or competition
were used to identify the NPM discourse; PG was associated with topics such as networks,
citizen participation, transparency or external accountability; and PA was identified in 
relation to such cues as rule, compliance or procedure. In all countries, the same codes (in 
their different languages) were used to identify the three discourses. We would like to point 
out, however, that our analyses exceed an automatic search or quantitative counting of words: 
the dictionary greatly aided the coding, but all documents were read by the coders in detail 
and it was left to the coders’ interpretation whether a keyword was used to cue a particular 
discourse or not. Data coding and analysis were supported by the software ATLAS.ti 6.
A statement can draw on a specific cue to either endorse or criticize a specific reform 
discourse; the visibility of a particular reform discourse in the debate reflecting either support 
or opposition. To identify this, we distinguished between “positive/neutral” (i.e. supporting – 
PA1, NPM1 and PG1 codes) versus “negative” (i.e. criticising or challenging – PA2, NPM2 
and PG2 codes) usage of the discourse key conceptual elements (e.g. “This [increase of 
efficiency] cannot be continued by centralism, by control via inputs, i.e. control only via 
expenditure. However, we have to continue. We need more decentralization” [Austria – 1st
Chamber Debate, 1999, p. 133] was assigned “negative” PA2 and “positive” NPM1; and
“The thrusts of amendments Nos. 24 and 25 are rather different, so I shall deal with them 
separately. Amendment No. 24 is clear: its purpose is to improve openness and 
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accountability in the Government's financial reporting” [UK – Mr. Davis, Third Standing 
Committee A, 2000] was assigned “positive” PG1). 
In order to increase internal validity and reliability (Trochim and Donnelly, 2006), the 
codebook was applied to each of the documents independently by two researchers, with all 
cases of disagreement being reviewed and resolved by the team. The unit of analysis was the 
paragraph. For the analysis of the relative prevalence of each discourse, we counted the 
number of occurrences of different signature cues within each paragraph3 (i.e. when four 
different NPM1 codes, supporting NPM arguments, occurred in a single paragraph, the 
paragraph was “weighted” as NPM1*4) and divided this number by the total number of cues 
coded (presented in Table 1).
In addition, in order to explore the extent of sedimentation of multiple reform 
discourses, we measured their co-occurrence and, thus, assigned binary codes to each 
paragraph indicating whether specific reform discourses were present or not (for example, 
when an NPM1 code occurred four times in a paragraph together with two PA1 codes, the 
paragraph was counted only once, see Appendix 2). The co-occurrence counts for each 
combination of reform discourses (e.g. PA1/NPM1) were normalised against the number of 
paragraphs in which the “smaller partner” code (e.g. PA1) was present (see Table 2). The less 
recurrent partner, indeed, represents a constraining factor to the frequency of a specific co-
occurrence (which can never exceed the frequency of the smaller partner code). This measure 
provides an indication of the extent different discourses (and their related ideas) co-exist in 
the official debates and become layered over time. Finally, to increase the comparability and 
for exposition purposes, we aggregated the data in three decades (the 1980s, the 1990s and 
the 2000s).
4. The accounting reforms in the three countries 
For each of the three analysed countries, Table 1 shows the overall distribution of the three 
reform discourses, whose data are presented in terms of both absolute counts and percentages 

3 The number of total hits for all the discourses was 13,776 in the UK, 8,941 in Italy, and 4,610 in Austria. 
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of the total number of codes for the specific decade. Similarly, Table 2 reports the co-
occurrences (i.e. the layering of the discourses) in both absolute counts and normalised 
against the total number of paragraphs where the smaller partner code was present. This table 
also shows in how many paragraphs the reform discourses appeared as “stand-alones”, i.e. 
not in a combination with elements from other discourses4. Following the presentation of the 
data, the debates and their stories are analysed5.
Insert Table 1 here 
Insert Table 2 here 
While Tables 1 and 2 describe the reform “talk”, the main features of the countries’ 
subsequent decided changes with respect to their accounting systems are outlined in Table 3. 
The alignment of the “talk” and the decided changes is explained in detail below. 
Insert Table 3 here 
4.1 The accounting reforms in the UK  
The rhetoric regarding accounting and budgeting reforms in official UK documents over the 
last three decades has predominantly been driven by managerial arguments (see Tables 1 and 
2). Considering the occurrence of the three discourses, NPM is by far the strongest in each of 
the three periods.
In the 1980s arguments supporting PA ideas had limited presence and, interestingly, 
were at their lowest level of any of the three decades (Table 1). While PG is almost non-
existent, the NPM discourse shows the highest occurrence of all the periods considered. This 
stresses the need to embed the new NPM ideas into the existing culture, thus insisting 
strongly on the associated concepts. This picture is confirmed by the co-occurrences 
(Table 2), where NPM arguments are often presented alone (59.6% of the paragraphs) and 

4 In this case the percentage rate was normalised against the total number of paragraphs where a specific 
discourse code was present.  
5 Only the main co-occurrences are displayed and discussed here. Often the negative codes (which, as can be 
seen in Table 2, did not have high levels of occurrence) did not co-occur with other codes. As a consequence, 
only the indicative combination PA2/NPM1 has been reported.
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mainly in positive terms (the co-occurrence between statements supporting NPM and 
criticising PA is the lowest of the three periods – PA2/NPM1). PG cues, instead, are mainly 
associated with NPM (3 times), then followed by PA (2 combinations). It has to be noted, 
however, that the 1980s were characterised by a smaller number of documents and relative 
counts (two documents for 327 hits in 40 pages) when compared to the other two decades 
under consideration. As a consequence, the results highlighted in this first period can be 
considered relatively less significant.
When we look at the reform changes decided in the same period, we see that in the 
early 1980s, accounting and performance measurement in the UK central government 
featured: cash budgeting with strict annuality requirements; cash accounting; and limited 
performance measurement and performance management. Since then it has progressively 
moved along a continuum of modernisation in budgeting, financial accounting and 
performance management (see Table 3). Different aspects of these changes have taken 
precedent in different time periods.  
The earliest significant changes were seen with respect to performance management. 
The Financial Management Initiative called for managers at all levels in central government 
to have (HM Government, 1982, p. 5) “a clear view of their objectives, and means to assess, 
and wherever possible measure, outputs or performance in relation to those objectives”. This 
high-minded aspiration was a leitmotif in the Next Steps Initiative, the Citizen’s Charter and 
developments in education and health care in the 1980s. For example, a report by the 
Efficiency Unit (1988) to the Prime Minister argued that the civil service was too big and 
diverse to manage as a single unit, and there was a need for smaller, performance-focused 
units. An extensive programme, referred to as the Next Steps Initiative, commenced aimed at 
delivering better quality central government services for the benefit of taxpayers, customers 
and staff. Performance measurement and reporting were also integral parts of the 
development of RAB in the mid-1990s and came again to the fore in the introduction of 
Public Service Agreements (PSAs) and Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) in 1998. In 
these, central government departments were held accountable for service delivery through the 
targets set out in their PSAs and SDAs.   
In the 1990s and 2000s the UK debate was highly interconnected because most of the 
changes widely discussed in the 1990s were planned for implementation (and thus discussed 
again) in the 2000s (see RAB and the Whole of Government Accounts – WGA – reforms). 
Although both the absolute and the relative counts 
16

the 1990s to increase again in the 2000s (thus not showing any definite trend), this discourse 
remains stable and predominant (having an average of approximately 64% of occurrences 
over these two decades – Table 1). The occurrence of the positive PA cues (PA1) similarly 
has no particular trend and is much weaker than the NPM codes, but the analysis also 
suggests that the traditional administration argument (related to elements such as rules, cash 
accounting and expenditure and input controls) has clearly survived in the different waves of 
reform over time (with an average of 25% over these two decades – Table 1). Finally, the 
positive PG codes (PG1), characterised by a very low, almost non-existent, base in the 1980s, 
show clear growth during the 1990s and 2000s, albeit still to rather modest levels in the last 
decade (8.9%). This suggests the emergence of PG in the UK central government scene, 
possibly reflecting a greater stress on accountability and transparency. The data highlight the 
emergence of this discourse, although more time may be needed in order to evaluate its future 
importance in the managerial and political arenas. 
The interpretation of the co-occurrence, indicating the level of sedimentation across 
the different discourses, while presenting a consistent picture, also highlights some 
interesting additional features in the UK (Table 2). The combination of PA2 and NPM1, 
where arguments against PA are presented in the same paragraphs as arguments in favour of 
NPM, increases in absolute terms (132 and 148 hits in the 1990s and 2000s respectively), but 
remains mainly stable (with NPM1 co-occurring in approximately 80% of the PA2 
paragraphs). Therefore, in the UK, especially from the 1990s it is not uncommon for 
arguments against PA to be used as a justification for NPM. For example:  
“Since resource budgets will score the full current cost of assets owned by the 
department, they will allow for easier comparison than under cash budgeting with the 
charges where a private finance option has been taken” (UK – HM Treasury [White 
Paper], 1995, p. 29).
As can also be seen in Table 2, in the 1990s and 2000s PG mostly co-occurs with 
NPM (over 50% in each decade), with the co-occurrence of PG1 and NPM1 increasing over 
time. The data demonstrate that PG1 cues are often combined with NPM1 ones (over the last 
two periods the PG1/NPM1 combination grew by 50%, from 203 to 322), rather than being 
present by themselves or combined with PA1 (PA1/PG1 co-occurrences decrease over time). 
In addition, PG is relatively frequently presented in association with both NPM and PA (co-
occurrence PA1/NPM1/PG1), although this combination reduced slightly (from 70 to 66) 
between the 1990s and the 2000s. The relatively moderate level of the three-way co-
occurrence could be explained by the increase in the comparative importance of the PG 
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discourse, whose ideas are more and more presented as independent arguments (the presence 
of the code ‘PG stand-alone’ in the UK goes from 68 paragraphs in the 1990s to 108 in the 
2000s). But what decisions were taken in the UK in the same periods? 
As can be seen in Table 3, it was decided to move financial accounting from its 
traditional cash base to a more commercial accrual base. The arguments for using the accrual 
model, in place of cash accounting, gained prominence and acceptance, and a move from the 
cash basis was agreed for central government (a Green Paper – HM Treasury, 1994; being 
followed by a White Paper – HM Treasury, 1995). This was developed under the title of 
“RAB”. Resource accounting, which extends beyond the cash-based accounting used 
previously by applying accrual principles to central government department accounting, also 
seeks to integrate objectives and targets into the accounting system. In addition, on the 
management accounting side, a subsequent move to resource budgeting, in order to make the 
management accounts align with the external accounts in central government, was agreed. 
The position of accrual accounting was further embedded by the production of Whole of 
Government Accounts (WGA – a consolidated set of accrual financial statements for the UK 
public sector, consolidating around 1,500 bodies, including central government departments, 
local authorities, devolved administrations, the health service and public corporations), with 
the first set of WGA being published in 2011. In the realm of budgeting, major changes have 
also occurred. As mentioned above (and shown in Table 3), the move from cash budgeting to 
resource (accrual) budgeting was announced in the mid-1990s and was “live” by 2003. In 
addition, annuality (the requirement for budget allocations to be spent by the financial year-
end or be surrendered to the centre) was abolished in 1997 at central government 
departmental level with end-year flexibility being permitted (allowing the carry forward of 
unspent resources from one year to the next). 
This is not to say that all accounting and budgeting reforms were announced and then 
implemented without adjustment and in accordance with initial timetables. Indeed, often a 
degree of evolution and shape adjustment took place between initial announcement and the 
final decided changes. For example, in the case of RAB, an Output and Performance Analysis 
(OPA), a performance-related statement included in the initial framing of RAB, was removed 
as a primary statement to be produced in the final agreed RAB structure (with many of the 
ideas relating to the OPA being subsumed within subsequent performance-related 
requirements connected to the production of PSAs and SDAs outside of the RAB process) 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2006b; HM Government, 2000; Likierman, 1998). Moreover, 
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perhaps the most extreme evidence of where significant delay occurred between initial 
proposal and final decided change in relation to NPM-type accounting adjustments was with 
WGA. Here the initial 1998 timetable targeted 2006 as the first year where such accounts 
were to be produced; in fact, this was delayed until 2011. It has been argued that a 
combination of competing priorities, limited resources, the UK public sector moving to 
International Financial Reporting Standards, and political and fiscal changes were largely 
responsible (Heald and Georgiou, 2009). During the gap between initial proposal and decided 
change, as political hues altered and debate and discussion relating to the initial 
recommendations took place, alterations to the detailed requirements occurred (Chow et al., 
2007; Heald and Georgiou, 2011). Although not the focus of this paper, the extent and 
reasons for such shaping of proposed accounting reforms after initial announcement, but 
before they are finally decided upon, and the involvement of actors in the process have been 
explored in other work (Christensen and Parker, 2010). 
Overall, from the UK data, while the NPM discourse is consistently strong and the PG 
one is strengthening, PA follows a weakening trajectory. As highlighted earlier in the paper, 
some previous studies have debated whether NPM could nowadays be considered dead and, 
if so, what its replacement would be (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Lapsley, 2008; Osborne, 
2010). Our analysis suggests that NPM is still alive and kicking and has been augmented as 
PG ideas have been interwoven and layered over time. PG, rather than replacing NPM, has 
complemented it. The comparison between the discussion (Tables 1 and 2) and the changes 
decided upon (Table 3) shows considerable alignment in the UK. While recognising that, 
with particular accounting tools, for a variety of reasons, initially launched timetables slipped 
and adjustments had to be made to detailed technical requirements (Connolly and Hyndman, 
2006b; Heald and Georgiou, 2009, 2011), the trajectory was essentially forward. Therefore, 
at a time when positive NPM arguments were dominating the discourse in official central 
government publications, accounting ideas associated with NPM were being driven into 
central government accounting systems. Moves from cash accounting, cash budgeting and 
strict annuality in the early 1980s (PA ideas), to accrual accounting (“live” by 2001), accrual 
budgeting (“live” by 2003) and end-year flexibility (from 1997) are clear evidence of this. 
Similarly, the massive expansion and focus on performance measurement and performance 
management are indicative of NPM themes being embedded (see HM Government, 1982, and 
the introduction of PSAs and SDAs in 1998). The deployment of NPM ideals has not been 
limited to a particular time period and continues even today. These reforms were not 
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introduced at a point in time, but rather were features of a rolling programme of accounting 
reforms associated with NPM ideas throughout the three decades considered. While these 
reforms were being announced (and planned to go “live”), the rhetoric used in the official UK 
government’s documents and discussions provided consistent argument and justification in 
their defence.
4.2 The accounting reforms in Italy 
The discussion around the accounting and budgeting reforms in the Italian central 
government highlights a substantial stability of the PA argument, notwithstanding the 
multiple attempts of introducing more NPM-like accounting tools and ideas. In the 1980s, in 
the general discussion, the PA discourse represents the most predominant one (63.7% of the 
total counts – Table 1), while NPM and PG cues are substantially less pervasive (respectively 
27.5% and 2.7%). While topics such as accountability and networks are the most frequently 
PG-signature words to occur, overall this discourse has very limited use in the documents of 
this period. Some interesting observations also emerge from the interpretation of the co-
occurrences (Table 2). Indeed, the PA “stand-alone” codes are the most frequent of the stand-
alone discourses (63.7% of the paragraphs containing at least one PA1 keyword) when 
compared with NPM and PG. This is consistent with the interpretation suggested above. The 
“PG stand-alone” cues occur only twice in terms of number of paragraphs (and are totally 
absent in the other two periods – Table 2). Moreover, arguments supporting PA are mostly 
associated with NPM cues (116 PA1/NPM1 combinations) suggesting that NPM concepts 
were often introduced relying on old systems and ideas.  
In terms of decided changes, the Italian central government budgeting and reporting 
had traditionally been cash and commitment-based with the main purpose to ensure 
budgetary compliance and control over expenditures. The accounting documents comprised 
the annual budget, the three-year budget, and the Financial Law (Clemente, 1992). In 1988 
the first accounting reform (Law 362/1988) introduced a new document, the Economic and 
Financial Plan (EFP), with the aim of reducing the perceived shortcomings of the traditional 
bureaucratic system by requiring the preparation and use of multiyear budgets (Table 3). The 
EFP required that, at a programme level, resources that the public sector drew from the 
private sector be stated as well as the detail of how these would be used. This sought to lower 
the impact of single-year budgets, while encouraging programme focus and the setting of 
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clear longer-term financial objectives relating to three-year budgets. The EFP was introduced 
through the annual Budget Law, although, at this time, no formal performance elements were 
required in the budget framework (see Table 3).  
In the following decade, the 1990s, the presence of the PA discourse decreases to 
52.3% of the total counts (the minimum of all the three decades – see Table 1); while the 
number of cues positively referring to NPM (NPM1) shows a peak (39.5% in the 1990s vs. 
27.5% in the 1980s and 35.6% in the 2000s). The NPM arguments mainly concerned the 
introduction of the new cost and accrual accounting systems, in particular in 1997 and 1999. 
The PG discourse was again rarely used in the documents (accounting for only 5.8% of the 
total – Table 1). Looking at the co-occurrences, the PA “stand-alone” codes are still the most 
frequent (35.7%, representing an even higher absolute count of 358 paragraphs). In the 1990s 
there is an increase in the co-occurrence rate related to the combination of PA1 and PG1 
codes, i.e. the combination between arguments supporting the PA and the PG discourses 
(71.7% of the paragraphs drawing on PG1 – Table 2). This remains relatively steady over the 
years (64% in the 2000s). When PG cues are present, they are usually associated with either 
NPM or PA arguments. 
The 1990s represent the period where the most significant reforms were decided. 
With respect to budgeting, major changes were made in the 1990s (Law 94/1997). Two 
distinct functions, political and managerial, were added to the traditional cash-based budget. 
Chapters (the most detailed level of appropriations, corresponding to the cash-based 
expenditure and revenue line items) were aggregated into broader expenditure and revenue 
basic budgetary units (corresponding to the functions, such as primary education and public 
security services, carried out by the different organizational departments) to be approved by 
parliament. The more detailed chapter classifications were left only for managers’ use. 
Approvals and expenditures were aligned to the structure of ministries and classified on the 
basis of homogeneous areas of activity and objective-functions (Collevecchio, 2004). In 1997 
cost accounting and accrual accounting systems were introduced (to parallel the traditional 
cash budget). The cost accounting system identified costs, responsibility centres and items 
directly related to efficiency and effectiveness indicators in each ministry and related these to 
the objective-functions identified above for the general system. The new and the old 
accounting systems were to run in parallel, with various adjustments and reconciliations 
made where appropriate. While accrual budgets were developed and issued, only the 
traditional cash and commitment-based budget had to be voted on by parliament. The accrual 
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budget had three specific phases (as seen in Table 3): proposed budget (ministries’ financial 
and human resources requirements), presented budget (updated financial figures) and 
definitive budget (objectives related to costs). An accrual financial statement was developed 
with the aim of providing a much greater focus on achieving non-financial results (Carabba, 
1994).
In the final decade under analysis, the 2000s, the debate and the rhetoric around the 
accounting and budgeting reforms give a picture similar to the first period: the PA discourse 
remains the strongest (53.6% of the total counts – Table 1), while there is a decrease in the 
relative number of cues positively referring to NPM (35.6%), and PG codes remain relatively 
marginal, with a small increase (8.5%). Among the co-occurrences, the presence of PA 
“stand-alone” cues continues to be the most significant of the “stand-alone” cues (15% of the 
paragraphs – Table 2). In this decade NPM and PG codes never “stand-alone”. Differently 
from the UK and Austria, PG hardly, if ever, appears alone, with it most often accompanying 
PA. This means that in Italy over time there has been a weak (maybe only formal) 
introduction of PG ideas into Italian documents (transparency and accountability being the 
main PG keywords found) within a predominantly PA discourse. It has also to be noticed that 
the level of sedimentation – i.e. the co-occurrence – among all the three codes (PA, NPM and 
PG) increases over time (PA1/NPM1/PG1 representing 32.1% of the paragraphs drawing on 
PG1 in the 1980s, 42.1% in the 1990s and 46.9% in the 2000s – Table 2). This trend is also 
mirrored by the decrease in the relative importance of NPM as an independent argument (the 
presence of “NPM stand-alone” codes goes from 86 paragraphs in the 1990s to zero in the 
2000s), and the almost non-existence of PG as an independent argument in any of the 
decades. Also the combination rate of PA2 and NPM1 cues (i.e. arguments against PA and in 
favour of NPM) increases both in absolute and percentage terms (from 52.4% of the 
paragraphs drawing on PA2 in the 1980s to 78.8% of PA2 paragraphs in the 2000s). 
However, considering the absolute number of counts (11, 26 and 26 hits in the three decades 
respectively), the co-occurrence is not as relevant as others are (such as the combination of 
PA1 and NPM1). But how was the return of the PA ideas mirrored in the decided changes in 
Italy? 
In the last decade (see Table 3), the traditional budget structure was again modified 
and reorganized into missions (ministries) and programmes (within ministries). Missions 
were realized through programmes (areas of homogeneous activities for the achievement of 
specific objectives). Each programme identified priorities, resources and objectives. In 
22

addition, the cost accounting system was revised to provide greater detail by nature, centre, 
mission and programme. In parallel, the overall organizational structure, including cost 
centres, was changed and an annual spending review was developed to assess ministries’ 
needs. Further adjustments to this were made in 2009 (Law 196/2009), when the 
commitment-based budgeting system was abandoned in favour of a two-year experimentation 
drawing on cash only. 
Comparing the debate with the decided changes, the Italian accounting reforms are far 
from linearly evolving towards the intended, more managerial model. On the contrary, PA 
arguments still prevail throughout all the periods. The increase in NPM codes in the 1990s is 
associated in time with the introduction of specific systems (cost accounting and accrual 
budgeting), the relevance of which slightly fades over time (again, in favour of discussions 
concerning the old cash-based logic). In Italy, more than a replacement of ideas over time, 
there is the sedimentation and layering of multiple discourses with a long-lasting 
predominance of the traditional PA discourse. When a formal managerial change was argued 
for, there was little pressure to replace old ideas (which were never really put under scrutiny 
but rather were largely reaffirmed under different shapes and expressions). This is illustrated 
in the following quotation (highlighting the supplementing of existing processes rather than 
their replacement): 
“Accrual-accounting, bookkeeping and outputs are used also to define the budget 
proposals, to better allocate resources, to plan financial activities, to monitor the 
financial impacts of budgetary changes and cost and legislative requirements in the 
areas for which the Administrations are responsible. They are used by the 
Administrations involved and by the Ministry of Treasure, to which data are 
communicated by the other Administrations – where possible via ICT evidence – 
through the responsible Accounting Offices” (Italy – Decree Law 279, 1997, p. 1).
The decision to introduce new NPM tools (sometimes, but not always, found in the political 
decisions) provides a basis for the old PA arguments to survive and reproduce themselves. 
4.3 The accounting reforms in Austria 
As regards the Austrian debate, the budgeting and accounting rhetoric in the 1980s is strongly 
shaped by the vocabulary provided by the PA discourse, both in terms of counts of signature 
cues (over 60% of this period – see Table 1) and occurrence in paragraphs. In addition, as 
Table 2 shows, this discourse has a high “stand-alone” quality: 70.9% of all paragraphs that 
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display at least one PA1 code draw exclusively on this discourse. The focus is on rules/norms
as well as on expenditure and cash. This is well aligned with the actual content of the 1986 
reform (codification of fragmented regulations based on cash budgeting): for decades, the 
federal budget legislation was fragmented; besides budget-related norms in the constitution, 
there was an unsystematic set of norms in several laws and regulations (mainly the federal 
budget regulation and the bookkeeping service regulation). The oldest laws in effect dated 
back to 1863 – i.e. the time of the Austrian Empire (Schwab, 1986). Many years of internal 
debate and studies of international best practices resulted in the codification of budget rules 
and procedures. The reform of 1986 (see Table 3) brought some new budget principles 
including an amendment to the constitution and the codification of budgeting and accounting 
rules in a more coherent law, the Federal Budget Law (FBL). This reform focused on rules 
for line-item budgets on a cash budgeting basis, obliged ministries to establish a cash and an 
accrual accounting system (yet, without detailed accounting rules) and integrated a medium-
term budget prognosis. 
While PG has limited visibility in the documents of this period (8.1% of all cues, 
mostly related to transparency issues and frequently co-occurring with keywords from other 
discourses), NPM is reasonably represented. It has 28.5% of the overall cues (see both NPM1 
and NPM2 in Table 1) and 49.5% of the coded paragraphs that use this vocabulary refer to no 
other reform discourse (see “NPM1 alone” in Table 2). Looking at the keywords from this 
discourse, we find objectives, responsibility, flexibility and, leading the list of cues, public
business. This is especially notable as it somehow rhetorically sets the stage for the 
agencifications and corporatisations of the following decades. In this sense, while the decided 
change is dominated by reforms firmly anchored in a classical bureaucratic paradigm, with 
only marginal elements of managerialism (such as a rule-based differentiated system for 
carry-forwards, accrual and cost accounting), the debate foreshadows the coming relevance 
of these issues.  
A decade later, the reform rhetoric used in the analysed documents is almost reversed. 
Arguments from the NPM discourse account for over 60% of the codes (see Table 1 – the 
main keywords used are evaluation and controlling, flexibility, efficiency, objectives, output
and cost), while the PA discourse (for both positive and negative codes) is reduced to 31.1% 
(main focus on rules/norms and expenditure). PG continues to lack visibility in this period. 
Moreover, a look at Table 2 shows that 56.5% of the paragraphs containing NPM codes draw 
exclusively on NPM, whereas the same is found for only one third of paragraphs using PA. 
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Especially interesting is the high overlap of PA and NPM, which represents two thirds of the 
paragraphs drawing on PA (as the smaller partner).  
This raises the question as to how the budgeting and accounting system has changed 
in that period. Between 1986 and 1999, the federal budget law was modified several times. 
Most formal changes were minor and had become necessary with the process of 
corporatization of governmental units. No significant modifications of the budget law 
concerning budget and accounting rules were made. However, on the level of budget 
practices, notable developments like the introduction of top-down-budgeting (for details see 
Blöndal and Bergvall, 2007), without formal codification and public discussion, took place. 
Finally, in 1999, a reform boost towards the application of management instruments in 
budget management followed. With the 1999 reform (referred to as the “flexibility clause”), 
the empowerment of state bodies with more managerial discretion was a milestone towards 
greater budgetary flexibility (see Table 3). This regime provided approximately 20 pilot state 
bodies (such as prisons, police schools or the printing office of the armed forces) with an 
annual lump sum budget and incentives for generating additional revenues, but combined 
with performance objectives. Furthermore, the units were given the possibility to carry 
forward budget that was not spent. However, this reform was still introduced within the cash-
budgeting framework of the 1986 law. Integral to this mode of management were 
performance contracts of the units with their line ministries (Hammerschmid et al., 2008). 
Without doubt, this reform was an important step on the public budgeting reform agenda. 
However, given that the budgetary system was still cash-based and the reform initiatives were 
neither substantial in substance nor in scope, the strong presence of NPM elements in the 
debate is still conspicuous. We take this as indication that the rhetoric displayed in the texts 
that accompany these reforms has been used to provide legitimation of the not yet taken-for-
granted features of the new practices.
In the third period, the predominance of arguments in favour of the NPM discourse 
prevails, although with decreasing intensity (53.1% of cues being NPM1 – see Table 1). With 
around a third of the codes, PA1 holds its position. For the first time, PG exceeds 10% of the 
total signature cues. The main keywords in this period are: cash and rules/norms from PA, 
accruals, flexibility and effectiveness from NPM and transparency and equality from PG. 
What is the actual content of the reforms that are rhetorically framed in such a way?  
The experience gained from the flexibility clause was an important input for the FBL 
reforms in 2007 and 2009 (to be introduced in two phases, going “live” in 2009 and 2013). 
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An amendment to the constitution and the codification of an entirely new budget law were 
necessary to provide the legal grounding for this. In 2007, a constitutional change for phases 
1 and 2 went along with an amendment to the organic budget law concerning the launching of 
the first phase of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the new rules to 
enable units to carry forward unused funds and for shifts between line-item budgets 
(Meszarits and Seiwald, 2008). The law as of 2009 incorporated the new accounting and 
budgeting principles of the constitution (outcome orientation, efficiency, transparency, and 
true and fair view) into the budget law. Whereas the 2007 budget law was an amendment to 
the 1986 law, in which the cash budgeting and accounting systems were not changed, the 
2009 budget law was newly codified. For this purpose, a number of performance 
management instruments were developed ranging from performance budgeting to 
performance reporting and performance-related contracts for government agencies (Steger, 
2010). In addition, accrual accounting and accrual budgeting were aligned to the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards framework so that a connection to international 
accounting practice was secured (Bauer et al., 2011). 
As the FBL was codified entirely anew in this period, it is unsurprising that cash and 
norms/rules are main keywords referred to. However, when looking exclusively at the 
parliamentary debates, we find NPM and PG dominating the agenda of the politicians. Given 
that in this period a wide variety of reform issues were incorporated into the budget law, it is 
perhaps remarkable how well represented all three reform discourses are. Indeed, all three 
have a reasonable “stand-alone” quality – about 44% of the paragraphs that use PA keywords 
exclusively relate to this discourse; the same applies to 48% using NPM and to almost one 
third using PG (see Table 2). While a lot of managerial talk in the 1980s and 1990s had 
anticipated the developments, the major reform initiative that introduced performance and 
accrual budgeting rhetorically invokes a consensus by making all three reform discourses co-
exist in the same document. This echoes prior research findings which suggested that 
accounts grounded in widely accepted beliefs are particularly effective in times when 
legitimacy is in danger and needs to be secured (Elsbach et al., 1998). 
Comparing the debate and the decisions, a number of observations can be made: in 
general, on the level of the decisions taken, the Austrian development can be described as a 
transformation from a bureaucratic model to an absorptive reformer that, on the level of 
debate and discussion, discursively insert viable elements of the NPM and PG discourses into 
the underlying legal and bureaucratic framework of the budgeting system. The overall 
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direction is as expected: starting from a predominantly PA-driven discourse, NPM becomes 
more and more relevant over time and, more recently, the PG discourse starts to leave traces 
in all genres. However, while PA loses relevance, we do not find a replacement with NPM 
and/or PG elements. Neither do we find a serious contestation of discourses (there are very 
few critical codes), but rather the discourses co-exist.  
5. The debates and the decisions in accounting reforms: a comparison of three countries 
When the present research is compared to the earlier literature on the intensity and speed of 
adoption of NPM-style reforms (Guthrie et al., 2005; Hood, 1995; Kickert, 2011; Knill and 
Balint, 2008; Olson et al., 1998; Ongaro, 2011; Wanna et al., 2010), some similarities and 
differences emerge. With respect to the speed of NPM-type accounting and budgeting 
changes, the UK was, as expected, the fastest (and most linear) of the three countries, 
followed by a slow but steady Austria and an oscillating Italy. While the UK and Austria 
remain largely in line with the frequent classifications, respectively as leader and late, but 
moderate, reformer, Italy’s apparent ambivalence to NPM-type accounting and budgeting 
changes (evidenced in terms of both rhetoric used over a period of three decades and 
accounting change decided upon), suggests a “laggard” label as appropriate. Indeed, despite 
its spasmodic engagements with NPM arguments over the years, the dominant discourse still 
remains PA; and its decided changes illustrate that NPM-type accounting changes are 
marginal rather than embedded.  
In the UK and in Italy there is a clear consistency between the debates and the 
accounting and budgeting changes decided. However, in the UK, both the decided changes in 
central government accounting and budgeting and the rhetoric around them were clearly 
directed towards managerial, NPM-oriented reforms. Over three decades they both constantly 
and consistently pushed in the same direction and, although different aspects of NPM-type 
changes were promoted at various times, resulted in a heavily-embedded changed system. On 
the other hand, in Italy PA was constantly the dominant trait, although with some NPM 
features being promoted at particular points in time. Overall, Italian accounting and 
budgeting reforms are constituted by a series of incremental changes (rather than a clear shift 
towards NPM ideas and systems), where NPM-type accounting adjustments (such as the 
introduction of cost accounting and performance measurement in 1997 and 2007) are ad-hoc 
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and not particularly embedded in the overall system. Both the systems and the associated 
rhetoric suggest an uncertain trajectory, characterized by a number of oscillations between 
PA and NPM ideas, but always and ultimately tightly linked to the traditional PA paradigm. 
For example, the 1997 law, while apparently introducing accrual accounting, actually re-
established the supremacy of cash accounting principles: 
“This act discharged by the Senate is politically particularly relevant, since it provides 
a link with the functional and organizational decentralization of this public 
administration. In the first section, it focuses on norms that are highly innovative. In 
particular, it states that the budget appropriations have to be structured into basic 
budgetary units [the basic items voted by the Parliament, larger than the previous 
appropriation items and related to the cash-based budgetary functions] under a unique 
responsibility centre, accountable for the management. The basic budgetary units are 
the object on which juridical decisions are taken [...]” (Italy – 1st Chamber Committee 
Discussion, 1997, p. 1).
In contrast to the UK and Italy, in Austria the rhetoric used to explain and justify and 
the reform decisions do not fully proceed in parallel. The debate was clearly still PA-oriented 
in the 1980s, with a significant move towards NPM ideas in the 1990s, albeit at this time the 
accounting and budgeting systems still displayed largely traditional PA-type features: 
“I think, one can truly say, that in the last few years, something has developed in our 
administration which we know from the area of private sector management, namely 
that more and more modern management methods, modern human resource 
management methods, means to increase efficiency and so forth have been introduced”
(Austria – 1st Chamber Discussion, 1999, p. 135). 
Although changes to more NPM-type reforms were first heralded in the 1980s, their 
introduction was not scheduled in this period. As seen in the Austrian case, although some 
NPM-oriented reforms (largely associated with new regulations relating to management 
accounting systems) were decided upon during the late nineties and the first decade of 2000, 
the majority of significant accounting and budgeting modifications are not due to be 
operational until 2013. In Austria the changes are gradually decided upon, and well before 
their introduction (and only after they have been rationalised well in advance).
Considering the trends highlighted by our analysis, it is evident that in each of the 
countries the three discourses have been discussed mainly in positive terms. For example, in 
the 1990s in Austria 62.8% of codes are NPM1 (i.e. positive usage of the NPM discourse), 
whereas only 2.8% codes are NPM2 (i.e. negative reference to the NPM discourse; see 
Table 1). Moreover, the co-occurrence of PA2 and NPM1 codes is relatively low in absolute 
terms (Table 2); a combination that may have been anticipated in a situation where NPM 
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reforms were being introduced to supplant supposedly deficient PA-type accounting and 
budgeting systems. While it is not surprising that text genres like bills and comments to the 
bills would not contain much open controversy, we find that even in the parliamentary 
debates tensions and contestation between the three discourses seem largely absent. A 
possible explanation for such a finding is that in the three countries the process of reform in 
accounting and budgeting systems and techniques has been generally characterised by a 
layering of different ideas, where discourses complement, rather than supplant, each other 
over time. Changes have been subsequently decided and introduced, building on each other 
and grafting the new ideas into the existing systems by stressing complementarities rather 
than contradictions. Adopting such a philosophy discourages the use of negative arguments in 
discussions and documents. This interpretation supports existing studies on processes of 
change and translations (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Cooper et al., 1996; Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010; Malhotra and Hinings, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) that suggest that 
change happens by sedimentation rather than by replacement of ideas and values.  
Sedimentation reflects a slow, layered, dialectical pattern of elements of new 
emerging structures, systems and beliefs combined with pre-existing ones. In reforming the 
public sector, “new brooms hardly ever sweep entirely clean” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, 
p. 12); rather, new elements are “introduced on top or alongside existing ones” (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010, p. 15), “making new and old institutions co-exist even when they are 
constituted on partly inconsistent principles” (Olsen, 2009, p. 18). Moreover, this also 
confirms prior research on translation of global concepts into local contexts (Czarniawska, 
2011; Drori et al., forthc.; Meyer and Höllerer, 2010; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008) that shows 
how the link to existing values, ideas and practices is actually a prerequisite for new ideas’ 
resonance in a particular context. This reasserts the persistence of existing systems, even 
when new layers of reform initiatives and regulations seem to introduce considerable 
changes. Consistently, a number of oscillations characterise the process (Malhotra and 
Hinings, 2005). Sedimentation as a change metaphor may help explain the seemingly 
peaceful coexistence of accounting and budgeting systems relating to different discourses in 
each of the three countries under study. Moreover, this interpretation would also explain the 
wavering that can be found in the Italian process of reform, characterised by a non-linear 
trajectory. Nonetheless, this layering and co-existence should not be mistaken for internal 
coherence of principles or “harmony” of interests. Tensions within the sedimented layers 
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provide a constant challenge to stability, and the fault lines inherent in the configuration may 
become manifest at a later time.  
With respect to the details of such trends and oscillations, it is interesting to highlight 
that references to the PG discourse go from being almost nonexistent in the 1980s (at least in 
the UK and Italy) to being stronger, although still relatively minor, in each of the countries 
afterwards. The question whether PG constitutes the new reform discourse of the post-NPM 
era (Osborne, 2006 and 2010) has triggered quite a debate. While some observers find that 
NPM is not at all “dead” but still alive and kicking (e.g. Drechsler, 2005; Lapsley, 2008), 
others point to different concepts that may become the prevailing reform discourses, e.g. 
public value (Benington and Moore, 2011), new digital governance (Dunleavy et al., 2006) or 
the neo-weberian state (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). As suggested by Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2011), at this point in time, it is still difficult to know whether PG actually constitutes a 
distinct “third wave” of reforms at all and, if so, whether the agenda it proposes will outlive 
mere faddish euphoria. Our results6 suggest that PG ideas seem to complement PA and NPM 
ones, rather than compete against them. Interestingly, Austria is the only country where all 
discourses are strong when considered by themselves (see the discourse “stand-alone” values, 
all above 30% for the same period – Table 2). As can be seen, in the last decade 31.4% of the 
total PG paragraphs contained PG arguments to the exclusion of the other discourses. PG is a 
more prevalent discourse in Austria, and it is more often found on its own, probably because 
of its greater emphasis on gender equality issues and as a consequence of the formal 
introduction of the “transparency principle” in the 2000s. Even here, however, it represents 
the weakest of the three discourses in each decade. In the UK and Italy, PG grows from a 
very low base in the 1980s to modest levels (about 9% – Table 1) in the final decade 
analysed. However, in these countries it is rarely independent of the other two discourses. 
Indeed, it appears only seldom on its own (particularly in Italy, where it emerges as a “stand-
alone” discourse in only 7% of the total PG paragraphs in the 1980s, while is totally absent as 
a “stand-alone” in the other two periods – Table 2) and it is almost always associated with the 
dominant discourse present in the specific country (NPM in the UK, PA in Italy). With 

6 Accountability is a concept that may, in different specifications, be used in different discourses (e.g. Behn, 
2001; Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995). In this study we coded for external accountability and associated it with 
PG (Bovens, 2007). However, an elimination of accountability as a discourse marker for PG would not have a 
significant impact on the findings: accountability is only one of the PG cues and, in terms of visibility, not the 
most frequent one. Thus, although PG would be overall slightly weaker if accountability was removed as a PG 
cue, in none of the three countries would it disappear entirely. In Austria, for example, where PG has a certain 
“stand-alone” quality, the accountability code appears overall only five times.  
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respect to the PA discourse, in Italy, where it dominates, it is often found on its own in a 
paragraph; however, the other two discourses are rarely found by themselves (as “stand-
alones”). PA became more and more associated with the different ideas brought in by NPM 
and PG, which complemented and supported, but not supplanted, it. This feature is 
particularly visible in the last period, when PA, now strongly combined with the different 
ideas from the other discourses, is still the only discourse that can be clearly and 
independently identified in Italy (appearing 15% of the times as a “stand-alone” – Table 2). 
We can conclude therefore that in the UK and in Italy PG does not represent a separate 
discourse, but rather a spin-off of NPM reforms (in the UK) or an emerging feature to 
underpin PA (in Italy). Only in Austria is there evidence that suggests PG might represent a 
new emerging discourse on its own, although such evidence is, at best, tentative as the issues 
represented are specific – related to gender equality and transparency - and remain unrelated 
to core characteristics such as sustainability, networks, partnerships, participation or civil-
society related concerns.
In each of the countries, over the three analysed periods, changes relating to the 
introduction of both NPM-type and (particularly in Austria) PG-type accounting and 
budgeting changes have proceeded at varying speeds and in different ways. These largely 
complement existing PA processes. In each country similar pressures coming into the public 
sectors from the external environment (Collier, 2001; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens, 2007) have been evident in the analysed documents: 
“We welcome the Government's acceptance that the principles of resource accounting 
should accord with Generally Accepted Accounting Practice. We recognise that the 
accounting standards and practices used in the private sector may need to be adapted 
to the central government sector as appropriate. But it is important that the necessity of 
adaptations is widely accepted, not just by Government” (UK – Public Accounts 
Committee, Ninth Report, 2000, p. 32). 
“Another emerging and important issue is related to the systems harmonisation, as a 
consequence of the Maastricht Treaty and the European Union. Under this perspective, 
we would need a budget scheme, which is receptive to the changes going on in the 
international scene at the moment, to which we have to adapt if we want to be able to 
read budgets of different States, especially if it’s true that with the globalization 
process we will have to take also these possibilities into consideration” (Italy – 1st
Senate Discussion, Law 94, 1997, p. 18). 
However, the responses of the three countries have been quite different: the UK 
embedding – relatively quickly and intensely – major NPM-style accounting reforms; Italy 
exploring NPM-style changes, but making modest adjustments to a rooted PA-type 
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accounting; and Austria slowly reflecting on required action, and gradually introducing, or 
proposing, what appears to be a substantive change to embrace both NPM and PG-related 
ideas. Reform discourses are not to be seen as predefined set of ideas, but rather as 
“umbrellas” under which a variety of different concepts and practices are available. Prior 
research has shown that some aspects of the differing responses may be due to the different 
starting points, institutional arrangements, cultural styles, and administrative systems, the 
attitude of the public and other important stakeholders, the knowledge and skills of public 
sector employees, as well as the specific power constellations of promoters and opponents of 
the reforms (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2010; Kickert, 2008, 2011; Lüder, 1992; Ongaro, 
2009; Painter and Peters, 2010). Our study suggests that another source of response 
heterogeneity stems from the specific sedimentation process followed by the reform 
discourses and characterising a country at a certain point in time. As a consequence of this, 
the UK reform process has been overall faster, while Austria and Italy, traditionally 
characterised by more formalised and bureaucratic public systems, may require more time, 
and effort, to introduce the change and define its direction. Differences, however, might also 
be influenced by different organizational conditions (such as available resources, capabilities, 
etc.) at the level of reform discussion and interpretation. These issues call for further research 
to achieve a better understanding of the factors explaining organizational differences in the 
interpretation and implementation of accounting reforms (Etherington and Richardson, 1994; 
Liguori, 2010; Liguori and Steccolini, 2012). 
6. Conclusions 
This paper focused on the changes in the accounting and budgeting systems at the central 
government level in the UK, Italy and Austria over the last three decades. Besides the actual 
content of the reform decisions, our paper also explored the extent to which the vocabularies 
used to debate and account for these reforms are fostered by the three discourses (previously 
identified as PA, NPM and PG) that have been predominant in the public sector over this 
time period. Differently from previous research, we did not aim to investigate a potential 
implementation gap, but looked at the level of sedimentation of the different ideas over time. 
Our study provides an updated view of the position of countries from three different 
European administrative traditions and their reform agendas. The approach adopted here 
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contributes to the existing literature on change processes, since it allows a comparison of the 
consistency of the official discussion with the subsequently decided reform changes, both 
within and across countries, assessing also the extent of sedimentation or replacement among 
different discourses and ideas. We have shown that, despite quite different starting points, all 
three countries underwent similar accounting reforms, albeit at different paces and with 
varying trajectories. We found considerable differences between the countries, especially 
with regard to the debates and the manner in which the rhetoric matched, or did not match, 
the content of the decisions it accompanied. Our study supports prior observations that reform 
discourses tend not to replace each other, but rather tend to supplement each other 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Schneiberg, 2007). The formation of these sedimentations 
seems to be quite distinct for each of the countries analysed, their systems all being hybrids. 
While they may use similar “ingredients”, each country made its own specific translation of 
the ideas and concepts and the layering of the various elements of the reform discourses 
differently results in heterogeneity. Moreover, we find that within each country debates and 
decided changes may highlight different aspects of the same discourse. 
Finally, the paper contributes to the current debate on the emergence of PG ideas as a 
self-standing, autonomous paradigm (Osborne, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). There is 
not necessarily a development from PA to NPM to PG over time. Although it might still be 
too early to draw conclusions regarding PG, our findings seem to suggest that the vocabulary 
provided by this discourse is used to supplement the prevailing discourse – NPM in the UK, 
PA in Italy, and the co-existence between the two in Austria – rather than supersede it.
As do all studies, as well as providing avenues for future research, this paper has 
some limitations. First of all, our focus on text genres from the legislative process excludes 
other arenas, e.g. the media or the academic debate, that are also relevant to assess the status 
of the three reform discourses. Moreover, the truly taken-for-granted aspects of institutional 
domains require no justification and therefore do not easily surface in official discourses 
(Green, 2004). Consequently, they cannot be grasped with the method applied. Second, our 
interest in accounting and budgeting changes represents only a certain spectrum of public 
sector reforms with specific influencing factors (e.g. financial markets, fiscal stress) that 
might not be equally relevant in other reform areas. Although we assume that these reforms 
reflect the overall “climate” for the countries over the three decades studied, future research 
is required to determine whether similar patterns can be found in areas like, for example, 
human resource management (e.g. performance related pay, tenure positions, etc.) or 
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agencification and the corporatization of the public sector. Furthermore, additional research 
may investigate the level of “action” (Brunsson, 1989; Pollitt, 2001) and the role played by 
organizational conditions in different countries. 
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Tables
Table 1–Discourse occurrence in the UK, Italy and Austria - a time comparison  
  1980s 
  PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 PG1 PG2 TOT 
UK
20.2% 
(66)*
0.9% 
(3)
78.0% 
(255) 
0.0% 
(0)
0.9% 
(3)
0.0% 
(0)
100% 
(327) 
IT 
63.7% 
(677) 
2.0% 
(21) 
27.5% 
(292) 
3.5% 
(37) 
2.7% 
(29) 
0.7% 
(7)
100% 
(1,063) 
AUT 
61.6% 
(586) 
1.6% 
(15) 
27.2% 
(259) 
1.3% 
(12) 
8.1% 
(77) 
0.3% 
(3)
100% 
(952) 
  1990s 
  PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 PG1 PG2 TOT 
UK
31.6% 
(2,123) 
2.5% 
(168) 
58.6% 
(3,932) 
0.8% 
(52) 
6.4% 
(428) 
0.2% 
(11) 
100% 
(6,714) 
IT 
52.3% 
(1,390) 
1.5% 
(40) 
39.5% 
(1,051) 
0.8% 
(22) 
5.8% 
(153) 
0.1% 
(3)
100% 
(2,659) 
AUT 
29.7% 
(86) 
1.4% 
(4)
62.8% 
(182) 
2.8% 
(8)
3.1% 
(9)
0.3% 
(1)
100% 
(290) 
  2000s 
  PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 PG1 PG2 TOT 
UK
18.2% 
(1,227) 
3.0% 
(205) 
68.4% 
(4,606) 
1.4% 
(95) 
8.9% 
(598) 
0.1% 
(4)
100% 
(6,735) 
IT 
53.6% 
(2,799) 
0.7% 
(35) 
35.6% 
(1,856) 
1.0% 
(51) 
8.5% 
(444) 
0.7% 
(34) 
100% 
(5,219) 
AUT 
33.0% 
(1,111) 
1.4% 
(48) 
53.1% 
(1,789) 
0.7% 
(22) 
11.8% 
(396) 
0.1% 
(4)
100% 
(3,370) 
(*) number of absolute counts 
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Table 2–Layering of reform discourse in the UK, Italy and Austria - a time comparison 
1980s 
  PA1/NPM1 PA1/PG1 NPM1/PG1 PA1alone NPM1 alone PG1 alone PA1/NPM1/PG1 PA2/NPM1 
UK
78.8% 
(41)*
66.7% 
(2)
100.0% 
(3)
17.3% 
(9)
59.6% 
(65) 
0.0% 
(0)
66.7% 
(2)
33.3% 
(1)
IT 
47.0% 
(116) 
53.6% 
(15) 
57.1% 
(16) 
63.7% 
(328) 
32.0% 
(79) 
7.1% 
(2)
32.1% 
(9)
52.4% 
(11) 
AUT 
47.7% 
(105) 
50.0% 
(37) 
18.9% 
(14) 
70.9% 
(326) 
49.5% 
(109) 
41.9% 
(31) 
10.8% 
(8)
33.3% 
(5)
1990s 
  PA1/NPM1 PA1/PG1 NPM1/PG1 PA1alone NPM1 alone PG1 alone PA1/NPM1/PG1 PA2/NPM1 
UK
47.8% 
(818) 
32.4% 
(130) 
50.6% 
(203) 
44.7% 
(765) 
59.1% 
(1,477) 
17.0% 
(68) 
17.5% 
(70) 
83.0% 
(132) 
IT 
39.7% 
(398) 
71.7% 
(104) 
54.5% 
(79) 
35.7% 
(358) 
12.3% 
(86) 
0.0% 
(0)
42.1% 
(61) 
78.8% 
(26) 
AUT 
66.7% 
(48) 
33.3% 
(3)
55.6% 
(5)
33.3% 
(24) 
56.5% 
(65) 
44.4% 
(4)
33.3% 
(3)
75.0% 
(3)
2000s 
  PA1/NPM1 PA1/PG1 NPM1/PG1 PA1alone NPM1 alone PG1 alone PA1/NPM1/PG1 PA2/NPM1 
UK
62.4% 
(658) 
19.6% 
(105) 
60.2% 
(322) 
27.6% 
(291) 
66.5% 
(1,947) 
20.2% 
(108) 
12.3% 
(66) 
80.4% 
(148) 
IT 
56.9% 
(682) 
64.0% 
(251) 
59.7% 
(234) 
15.0% 
(295) 
0.0% 
(0)
0.0% 
(0)
46.9% 
(184) 
78.8% 
(26) 
AUT 
52.0% 
(463) 
36.1% 
(123) 
57.5% 
(196) 
43.7% 
(389) 
48.0% 
(530) 
31.4% 
(107) 
24.9% 
(85) 
78.3% 
(36) 
(*) number of absolute counts 
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Table 3– Main Features of the accounting changes decided in the UK, Italy and Austria
 AUSTRIA  ITALY UK 
1980s
Budgeting x 1986 Codification of budgeting and 
accounting rules:  
¾ cash budgeting 
¾ medium budget planning report 
¾ line-item budget 
¾ definition of macro-economic 
budget objectives. 
x Co-existence of cash and commitment 
systems derived from the past.  
Main principles: budgetary compliance 
and control over expenditures.  
Accounting documents: the budget, the 
three-year budget and the financial law. 
x 1988 Introduction of EFP (Economic 
and Financial Plan) in order to focus on 
programmes and set clear financial 
objectives over the three-year period of 
the long-term budget. 
x 1980 Based on cash and principle of 
annuality.  
Financial
Accounting
x 1986 Cash accounting as main 
accounting system. 
x Cash and commitment as main 
accounting systems 
x 1980 Largely cash based and mainly 
focusing on cash received and cash 
spent.
Performance 
Management 
x No formal performance elements in the 
budget framework. 
x No formal performance elements in the 
budget framework. 
x 1982 Commencement of attention to 
performance measurement in Financial
Management Initiative calling for 
managers at all levels in central 
government to have a clear view of their 
objectives and their performance.  
x 1988 Intensification of performance 
focus with the introduction of the Next
Steps Initiative and the creation of 
Executive Agencies which had strict 
regimes of reporting and planning in 
terms of performance.  
1990s
Budgeting x Overall: system largely as in the 1980s 
until 1999. 
x 1999 Pilot projects for approx. twenty 
x 1997 Revision of the budget in two 
distinct functions (political and 
managerial). Consequent 
x 1994-1995 Announced that resource 
(accrual) budgeting to be introduced in 
all government departments as part of 
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selected state bodies 
(Flexibilisierungsklausel) including: 
¾ cash budgeting 
¾ lump-sum budgets  
¾ carry-forward possibilities 
¾ multi-annual budgets 
¾ incentive and sanction structures. 
reclassification of revenues and 
expenditures.
the Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
(RAB) changes (late 1990s – dry-run 
and transitional exercises to bed system 
down).
x 1997 End-year Flexibility (EYF) 
introduced with respect to budget carry 
forward.
x 1998 Treasury-led Spending Reviews
initiated to set firm and fixed spending 
budgets over several years for each 
government department. 
Financial
Accounting
x 1999 Cash accounting (accrual and cost 
accounting do not play a major role; no 
reform in the field of financial 
accounting).
x 1997 Introduction of accrual budgeting, 
although only traditional cash- and 
commitment-based budgets that have to 
be approved by parliament. 
Phases of the accrual budget:
¾ proposed budget (ministries account 
for their financial and human 
resources needs) 
¾ presented budget (updated financial 
figures)
¾ definite budget (objectives are 
reconsidered and adjusted to costs).
“Objectives-resources-results” efficiency 
paradigm introduced.  
Accrual financial statement gives more 
focus on non-financial results.  
x 1994-1995 Announced that resource 
(accrual) accounting to be introduced in 
all government departments as part of 
the RAB changes (late 1990s – dry-run 
and transitional exercises to bed system 
down).
x 1998 Treasury first published a scoping 
study for Whole of Government 
Accounts (WGA).
Performance 
Management 
x 1999 Pilot projects for state bodies 
(Flexibilisierungsklausel):
¾ performance measurement 
¾ performance contracts 
¾ setup of a performance controlling 
committee to which performance 
indicators are reported. 
x 1997: Cost accounting items directly 
related to efficiency and effectiveness 
indicators as identified by each ministry. 
x 1994-1995 Announced that Statements
of Resources by Departmental Aims and 
Objectives to be introduced in all 
government departments as part of the 
RAB changes – late 1990s dry-run and 
transitional exercises to bed system 
down.  
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x 1998 Performance-focused Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs) and Service 
Delivery Agreements (SDAs) introduced 
as a key-aspect of a quasi-contract 
between the Treasury and government 
departments. 
2000s
Budgeting x 2004 Regulation: cost accounting for 
central units of ministries 
x 2007 Change of constitution – new 
budget principles: outcome orientation, 
efficiency, transparency and true and fair 
view (in effect 2013) 
x 2007 Change of organic budget law (in 
effect 2009):
¾ Medium-term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) 
¾ lump-sum budgets 
¾ carry-forward possibilities. 
x 2009 Second phase of the budget reform 
(in effect 2013): 
¾ programme budgeting 
¾ accrual budgeting 
¾ fiscal sustainability reports 
¾ incentive and sanction structures for 
line ministries. 
x 2007 Reorganization of the cash- and 
commitment-based budget on missions 
and programmes:  
¾ missions (the main functions and 
pursued strategic objectives) define 
the new political structure of the 
budget (ministries’ responsibility) 
¾ Programmes represent the 
realization of missions (areas or 
homogeneous activities for the 
achievement of specific objectives).  
x 2009 Commitment-based budgeting 
abandoned in favour of a two-year 
experimentation drawing on cash only. 
x 2003 Resource (accrual) budgeting 
“live” in all central government 
departments.  
x 2009 Government discussion paper 
issued with the objective of achieving 
better alignment of accounting and 
budgeting information.  
Financial
Accounting
x 2009 Second phase of the budget reform 
(2. Etappe der Haushaltsrechtsreform), 
in effect 2013: 
¾ accrual accounting (integrative 
system of cash and accrual numbers) 
¾ integrative cost accounting 
¾ consolidated financial reports in the 
x 2007 Partial revision of cost accounting 
system with further detail on chart of 
accounts (costs recorded by nature, 
centre, mission and programme – 
mirroring the accrual budget). 
Organizational structure and cost centre 
changes. Annual spending review 
x 2001 Resource (accrual) accounting 
“live” in all central government 
departments 
x 2011 First set of Whole of Government 
(WGA) accounts.  
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long-run. introduced. 
Performance 
Management 
x 2009 Second phase of the budget reform 
(2. Etappe der Haushaltsrechtsreform), 
in effect 2013: 
¾ performance budgeting 
¾ performance contracts for agencies 
¾ performance reporting 
¾ performance controlling. 
x As in the 1990s. x 2001 Statements of Resources by 
Departmental Aims and Objectives
required to be produced as part of the 
RAB changes in all central government 
departments.  
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Appendices
Appendix 1–Keywords identification 
Hammerschmid 
and Meyer, 
2005; Hinings 
and Greenwood, 
1988; Liguori, 
2010; Liguori, 
and Steccolini, 
2012; Osborne, 
2010; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004, 
2011 
PA Discourse NPM Discourse PG Discourse 
Main ideas and 
arguments
Public administration (citizens) Service provider (customers) 
Governance and market rules 
setter (stakeholders) 
Based on professional 
differentiation
Based on the integration of professional 
activities
Based on negotiation of values, 
meanings and relationships
Professional practice defined 
by intrajurisdictional 
professionals
Analytical appraisal by transjurisdictional 
management
Enablement skills: Activation, 
orchestration, modulation 
Public administration as a 
closed system  
Public administration as an open system  
Public administration as an 
“open closed” system (external 
focus but providing enclosing 
regulation of public services) 
Constitutive role of legitimacy Performance-driven legitimacy  
Legitimacy through negotiated 
agreements and democratic 
accountability  
Objectives selected in 
accordance with political  
rationality  
Objectives selected in accordance with 
economic and organizational rationality  
Objectives selected in 
accordance with networking and 
negotiation with different actors  
Neutral and objective 
administrative activity, 
separated from politics and 
executing law 
Administrative activity interacting with politics: 
politics sets strategy, managers reach objectives 
Administrative activity 
interacting with the 
environment: systematic and 
effective consultations with 
stakeholders
Structures and 
systems
High differentiation and low 
integration
Modest differentiation and high integration 
Integration of people, processes, 
structures and resources  
Incremental resource allocation 
system 
Non-incremental resource allocation system 
Inter-organizational and 
negotiated resource allocation  
Hierarchical bureaucratic 
control system  
Decentralized control system 
Inter-organizational control 
systems with different scope and 
tightness
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Internal organization untied to 
selected objectives 
Internal organization tied to selected objectives
External organization and 
network of actors tied to 
negotiated objective
Focus on formal procedures Focus on processes and results (input-output) 
Focus on ‘steering’ of complex 
networks in societal policy 
sectors
Formal evaluation, based on 
regulation
Efficiency and effectiveness evaluation 
Governance, transparency, 
accountability, equity and 
sustainability
Accounting
structures and 
systems
Main purpose: to limit 
spending; to show compliance 
of actions with budget 
Main purpose: to orient behaviours toward goal 
attainment 
Main purpose: to answer 
stakeholders’ needs 
Basis: obligation and cash Basis: accrual - 
Focus: financial indicators and 
inputs 
Focus: performance indicators, outputs  
Focus: outcomes, transparency 
and accountability indicators 
Tools: budgetary accounting 
Tools: executive budget, accrual-based 
reporting, managerial control systems, 
performance measurement 
Tools: consolidated statements, 
social/sustainability reporting, 
stakeholders’ reports 
Centralized data gathering, 
information processing and use 
(Finance Officer) 
Decentralized data gathering, information 
processing and use; integrated accounting 
system 
Data gathering from different 
actors of the network, inter-
organizational integration of 
information systems 
Finance Officer Audit control/controller/integrated management 
‘Network manager’ as 
conductor, intermediator and 
facilitator
Code Keywords 
Ǧ bureaucratic/bureaucracy Ǧ citizen Ǧ rules/norms/requirement Ǧ compliance Ǧ cash/commitments Ǧ administrator/bureaucrat Ǧ execute/executor Ǧ hierarchy/hierarchical 
Ǧ NPM/managerialisation Ǧ efficiency Ǧ effectiveness Ǧ output/results/outcomes Ǧ satisfactionǦ customers/client Ǧ managers/managerialǦ strategy
Ǧ governanceǦ transparency Ǧ external accountability Ǧ stakeholderǦ networkǦ partnership/partners  Ǧ sustainability/sustainableǦ ethic
49

Ǧ neutralǦ objectivity/objective Ǧ expenditure/spending Ǧ proceduresǦ central(ized) Ǧ function Ǧ independence
Ǧ performance/performance 
measures/indicator/target/objectiveǦ accruals/resources/value for money Ǧ contract/PPP/PFIǦ quality/appropriateness Ǧ expensesǦ audit/auditingǦ cost/amortisation Ǧ process Ǧ flexibility Ǧ decentralized/devolved Ǧ responsible/responsibility Ǧ “public business” Ǧ market Ǧ corporatization/agencies/agencification,  Ǧ competition/tendering/benchmarking  Ǧ privatizationǦ deregulation 
Ǧ equity/fair Ǧ participation/participative Ǧ integration/integratedǦ consolidation/consolidatedǦ negotiation/consultation Ǧ civil society/non-profit/third 
sector 
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Appendix 2–An example of coding (UK) 
Text
Occurrence of reform 
discourses (table 2) 
Co-occurrence of reform 
discourses/sedimentation 
(table 3) 
House of Commons Hansard Debates, 6th December 1999, p. 2) 
(...)
“The Bill [2000 RAB Bill] delivers four major reforms. First, it introduces resource 
accounting and budgeting (NPM1) into the Government accounts and modernises the 
operation of other aspects of the Exchequer and Audit Acts. Secondly, it improves the 
way in which Parliament votes on and scrutinises public spending (PA1), with proper 
measurement of the full economic costs (NPM1) of Government activities, better 
treatment of capital spending and systematic reporting of the allocation of resources 
(NPM1) to objectives (NPM1)” (emphasis and codes added) 
PA positive (PA1): 1 
PA negative (PA2): 0 
NPM positive (NPM1): 4 
NPM negative (NPM2): 0 
PG positive (PG1): 0 
PG negative (PG2): 0 
PA1/NPM1
